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Abstract 
 
The late twentieth-century Serbian nationalist discourse is seen as a 
manifestation of the same rhetoric which was initially formulated in the 
period of national awakening associated with the two uprisings against 
the Turkish rule under Karadjordje Petrovi (1804-13) and Miloš 
Obrenovi (1815-17) and the institution of the autonomous Serbian 
principality after the Russo-Turkish War (1828). The methodological 
tool used in this paper to analyze the Serbian nationalist discourse in the 
late 20th century is a set of binary oppositions underlying the formation 
of Serbian national identity, which was skillfully manipulated by the 
former leader Slobodan Miloševi.  
 
 
Despite Eric Hobsbawm’s optimistic predictions in 1990,1 nationalism as a topic 
for scholarly debate cannot as yet be laid on the shelf and forgotten. In 
considering Central and South-Eastern Europe, the “loose ends” in the solutions 
adopted for parts of former Yugoslavia could in the future cause further 
destabilization in the area. 
In his book Nationalism Reframed, Rogers Brubaker specifies three 
distinct varieties of the Central and East European nationalisms of the 1990s: the 
nationalizing nationalisms of newly independent states, the transborder 
nationalisms of external national homelands and the minority nationalisms within 
the borders of the new national states (Brubaker 1996: 4-5). Since in former 
Yugoslavia ethnic groups lived in each other’s pockets,2 most of their respective 
nationalisms can be seen as threefold, i.e. manifesting themselves in each of the 
above varieties.  
Serbian nationalism notably transcends Brubaker’s triadic nexus. In Serbia 
proper, it is manifested as a desire to own a state which will have the Serbian 
nation, defined in ethnocultural terms, at its core. In the period after World War 
II, this desire found its most explicit expression in the 1986 Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. It is closely related to the thwarted 
appetites of Serbia as the “external national homeland” to Serbian minorities in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, to absorb territories beyond its 
borders. Brubaker’s third category corresponds to the nationalism of the Serbs in 
Croatia, but it cannot account for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
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the Serbian area, covering 49 percent of the territory, is now 94 percent Serbian; 
or for Kosovo, which is for all intents and purposes within Serbia’s borders. This 
article focuses on the nationalizing nationalism of Serbia proper, as the spiritus 
movens and constant point of reference in this complex interplay.  
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution and 1981 Albanian revolt prompted 
Serbia’s intellectual and political elite to begin working with all their strength on 
the ethnic homogenization of the Serbian national consciousness, forging it 
through blood ties and strengthening it through ever-closer relations with the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. According to one of its main ideologues, Dobrica 
osi — a novelist and former President of the rump Yugoslavia — Serbian 
nationalism, by its very nature, could not allow any internal conflict:  
Only big nations are capable of paying their respect to the individual. In 
the case of small nations it is not possible because of the national myths and 
taboos. Only the nation itself can be great, while the moral responsibility of 
individual demands sacrifices to community, nation, state. (Quoted in Popov 
1993: 16) 
The monolithic quality of the late-twentieth century Serbian nationalist 
discourse was promoted by the overtly controlled media. The new rhetoric, rich 
in clichés from folk history, was criticized by Belgrade dissident Bogdan 
Bogdanovi as a “dizzying repetition of pseudo-patriotic terminology [with] a 
shamanistic effect” (Miloševi 1995: 111-2). This phenomenon is not unique to 
Serbian nationalism: rather, it seems to be a locus communis of all discourses 
pertaining to nationalizing nationalisms. Dubravka Ugreši, for example, writing 
in war-time Croatia (1993), experiences it as a straightjacket imposed on her own 
intellectual integrity and attributes it to the insecurity of newly independent 
states: 
The business of building begins with naming. This is a house; this is the 
homeland; this is black; this is white. [Yet] naming is the work of God […] it 
appears to be intended to convince oneself and others of the actual existence of 
the new reality. It is only in firm coordinates, in a clear and named world, that we 
shall not be lost, not threatened by the chaos of madness, ambiguity, multiple 
truths. Because we are at the beginning, we need one truth. (Ugreši 1997: 160) 
Another important feature that Serbian nationalist discourse shares with 
the discourses of other nationalizing nationalisms of Central and South-Eastern 
Europe is its reliance on binary oppositions in the process of exclusion and 
collective identity building. I would like to suggest that nationalist discourse of 
this kind mainly operates along two emotionally charged dichotomies: 
 
Personal dichotomy “I” vs. “non-I”, which can be translated into “my 
nation” vs. the “Other” ; and Spatial dichotomy “here” vs. “not here”, which 
becomes the “territory of my nation-state” vs. the “terre irredente to which I lay 
claims”  
 
I will organize my argument around these oppositions, in order to 
demonstrate the complex ways in which they animate the discourse and 
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ultimately motivate Serbian nationalist behavior. These dichotomies, which 
underlie the formation of national identity and the development of territorial 
pretensions, also determine which historical data are “remembered,” “modified” 
or forgotten by the nations concerned. 
 
“I” vs. “Non-I” 
This dichotomy is built around a number of ethno-cultural considerations 
and has to be traced back to its inception in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Who are we? What distinguishes us from other nations? The most 
obvious areas offering possible answers to these questions are those of language, 
folk history and popular culture: the three “codes” which in Serbia’s case most 
significantly intersect in the sphere of traditional oral literature in general and of 
epic poetry in particular. 
This most fertile resource pool for the construction of Serbian national 
identity was extensively explored by early nineteenth-century nationalizers such 
as Vuk Karadži and Petar Petrovi Njegoš. The heroic songs in deseterac 
(decasyllable), recounting an idealized version of historical events, had been at 
the centre of Serbian ethnic awareness in feudal times. These songs are 
traditionally performed by a single singer, who accompanies himself on a string 
instrument called gusle. Each line is divided into two parts by a strong caesura 
after the fourth syllable. The songs, which are firmly embedded in the epic 
tradition, make frequent use of set phrases and epithets, such as rosy wine, flat 
field, green mountain, splendid horse, handsome warrior and similar.  They are 
charged with association and, according to Milne Holton and Vasa D. 
Mihailovich, “chipped into the brain of every Serb” (Holton and Mihailovich 
1988: 85).  
Although the songs cover a variety of moral and existential themes,3 the 
most prominent motif is the suffering of the Serbian people under the Ottoman 
yoke. The battle between the Turks and Balkan Christians at Kosovo Polje in 
1389 – which Noel Malcolm calls the “totem and talisman of Serbian identity” 
(Malcolm 1998: 58) — is an endlessly repeated theme in Serbian heroic poetry. 
The mythopoeic epic interprets Prince Lazar’s defeat at Kosovo Polje as the fall 
of the Serbian Empire.4 Numerous heroes, historical or invented, but familiar to 
the point of internalization, fight courageously and eventually fall in the battle,5 
victims of betrayal and brutal aggression. Another theme from epic poetry which 
informed Serbian nation-building in the nineteenth century — a certain 
single-minded fatalism — is best exemplified by young Gojko Mrnjavevi,6 
who buries his young wife within the walls of the Skadar fortress, as a sacrifice 
demanded by the mountain vila, or nymph in Slavic mythology. In mid-
nineteenth century, the three main elements of the self-styled Serbian national 
identity — heroism, victimization and fatalism — were immobilized in a fiercely 
orientalist discourse, in binary opposition with the Crescent (“infidel” Turks) in 
Njegoš’s epic Gorski vijenac (The Mountain Wreath). 
In the 19th century, the drive for unification of the South-Slavic peoples 
was well under way in Croatia, spurred originally by the Illyrian movement, a 
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cultural revival from under Habsburg yoke. The most prominent political forces 
in Serbia were at the beginning resistant to the idea of South Slav unification, as 
they did not at the time see it as a possible vehicle for national consolidation and 
expansion. Early in the 20th century, the narrative of Serbian victimization and 
adverse fate gave way to a new feeling of confidence prompted by victories of 
Serbia and its allies in the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the ensuing 
territorial gains – most notably, of Kosovo and parts of Macedonia. The new self-
esteem brought about a change of heart regarding the possibility of forging a 
South Slav union. It was given a further boost at the end of World War I:  
 
Serbia was jubilant, at the height of glory and prestige, although it had lost 
one-fourth of its population and half its economic assets in the war. At long last, 
the chance to create, if not a Great Serbia, then at least a united South Slavic state 
was at hand. 
(Prpi-Jovanovi 1995: 43) 
 
And indeed, Serbia kept the upper hand in the first 20th-century Yugoslav 
state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-41), which meant that narratives of 
victimization were quickly appropriated by other ethnic groups in the Kingdom, 
notably the Croats. Serbian nationalist rhetoric resurfaced in World War II, 
particularly in narratives surrounding Draža Mihajlovi’s royalist Chetnik 
movement. In Tito’s Yugoslavia it became prominent again after the 1974 
Constitution, which granted the two Serbian “autonomous provinces” – Kosovo 
and Vojvodina – a de facto republican status. 
In the late twentieth century, a self-conscious heroism, victimization and 
fatalism were pushed forward daily in Miloševi’s controlled media. Orientalism 
was resurrected in modern-day Serbian nationalist rhetoric in relation to both the 
Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians. President of the Republika Srpska, 
Biljana Plavši, accused Bosnia’s Muslims of pursuing a form of “sexual terror” 
against the Serbs that was “genocidal in character.” She also referred to the 
Islamic practice of polygamy and to the “right to the first night” she said was 
enjoyed by Muslim notables with Christian women under the Ottoman Turks 
(Cohen 1998). Albanians are often portrayed as fecund,7 inferior and incurably 
irredentist. They are viewed as having been privileged in the Ottoman Empire 
and as having taken over properties left behind when Serbs fled northward in the 
17th and 18th centuries.  
The twentieth-century Serbian national identity also relies on a more 
recent binary opposition, in which the enemy is seen as “fascist” or almost 
“genetically programmed for genocide.” Miloševi’s propaganda machine 
incessantly used images from the real Croatian genocide against the Serbs during 
World War II to portray every contemporary Croat as a latter-day fascist ready to 
follow in the footsteps of his or her predecessors (see, for example, Kresti 
1997). Neo-fascism was also often attributed to the Bosnian Muslims and 
Albanians. Many Bosnian Muslims initially embraced the Ustaša rhetoric, which 
had declared that Muslims were Croats’ brothers and that Croatia was a nation 
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with two recognized religions, Catholicism and Islam. As for the Albanians, 
already in 1986, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 
spoke of their “neo-fascist aggression in Kosovo” and their attack on the “cradle 
of the Serbs’ historical existence.” (Mihajlovi and Kresti 1995: 127, 129) 
 
“Here” vs. “Not Here” 
This dichotomy refers to the territory of the Serbian state within its official 
borders at any given moment in the history of Serbia as a nation-state, i.e. since 
1829, in relation to the greater territory to which the nation lays claim. The idea 
of a “Greater Serbia” — the battles to achieve it, frustration and blaming the 
Other (under the sign of the Crescent, Swastika or, most recently, NATO military 
insignia) and eventual resignation — goes hand in hand with the idea of heroism, 
victimization and fatalism of the nation. It is built on the myth of a “glorious 
medieval empire” overpowered and extinguished in Turkish invasions. The idea 
of a recreation and further expansion of this empire — a kind of Serbian Megale 
idea8 — reemerges periodically in Serbian history. Peter Sugar attributes this 
peculiar expansionism of Serbian nationalism to the fact that for Serbia, the state 
and the national awakening happened simultaneously (Sugar 1995: 357). 
In order to understand the territorial claims underlying Serbian nationalist 
rhetoric, it is necessary to take a step back in history to the medieval period, 
considered by nationalists as Serbia’s “Golden Age”. From 1169 onwards, Raška 
(as Serbia was then called) underwent a considerable expansion into neighboring 
lands in present-day Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and central Serbia. 
Raška also expanded southward under King Milutin (reigned 1282-321), 
conquering territory from Byzantium. The dominion of Milutin’s son Stefan 
Dušan (1331-55) extended from the Danube to central Greece. Dušan’s empire 
disintegrated after his death; prince Lazar and his allies were defeated at the 
Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389); and the Turkish conquest of the Serb territory was 
accomplished in 1459. In the centuries that followed, the Serbs were vassals in 
the Ottoman feudal system. The so-called Vojna Krajina (Military Frontier) was 
formed during the reign of Ferdinand I (1526-1564) to protect Austria from 
Ottoman invasions. It was under the direct jurisdiction of the War Council in 
Graz as a separate administrative area. It consisted of two sections: Croatian, 
with the centre in Karlovac, and Slavonian, with the seat of command in 
Varaždin.  The population in this area consisted mainly of the Orthodox from the 
Dinaric Alps regions. 
The scope of Serbia’s future terre irredente was extended further by the 
two great migrations ahead of the invading Turks, led by the patriarchs Arsenije 
III rnojevi (1690) and Arsenije IV Šakabenta (1737) to territories in present-
day Vojvodina (Srem, Banat, Baka), northwestern Bosnia and parts of Croatia 
(Slavonia, Baranja, Banija, Kordun, Lika and continental northern Dalmatia). 
The significance of these migrations for the Serbian nationalist discourse is 
twofold: firstly, it is claimed that Albanians came to Kosovo only after the 
migrations, to fill the vacuum left by the exodus (see, for example, Roth 1996); 
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secondly, the migration legends boosted the national awareness of the Serbs in 
the areas where they were a minority. 
 
The first systematic treatment of the Great Serbian program was devised 
by Ilija Garašanin, Minister of Internal Affairs in the government of Aleksandar 
Karaorevi, the son of the rebel Karaore in 1844. In a secret Memorandum 
(Naertanije, trans. Draft) he sent to the prince, Garašanin recalled the mythical 
Golden Age of medieval Serbia and speculated on the possibility of recreating it. 
He then listed potential territories to be included in a Greater Serbia: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and northern Albania. He was also interested in Serbs 
living in Banat, Baka, Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, but refrained from 
advocating unification with these areas because they belonged to Austria, which 
was in his opinion too strong to be challenged. The “unity of the Serbian people 
and Serbian lands” was also supported by the Serbian Orthodox church. 
The Greater Serbian idea later developed in two different directions: the 
first was envisaging a powerful state in which all Serbs would be included; the 
second streak, aspiring to a united state of several South-Slavic nations,9 with 
Serbia at its core, was to be put into practice in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, called Yugoslavia from 1929 onwards. The proclaimed 
Yugoslavism in this state was experienced by the non-Serbs as aggressive 
Serbian hegemony and enforced Serbianization. World War II saw the 
disintegration of interwar Yugoslavia into a number of separate entities, some of 
which – notably, Kosovo within the Italian-run Albania and the Independent 
State of Croatia, incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina – either sided with or 
were under direct control of the Axis powers. Thus, the “Other” associated with 
these two entities – the Kosovo Albanian and the Croat – became fixed as 
‘fascist’ in the black-and-white nationalist discourse. As mentioned before, 
omnipresent and uncritical labeling of these two ethnic groups as “fascist” 
became part and parcel of Serbian nationalism of the external homeland in the 
1990s. 
As early as 1942, Tito condemned the “numerically insignificant minority 
of Greater Serbian hegemonists” (Sugar 1995: 311) who had promoted national 
oppression in pre-World War II Yugoslavia. The new federal republic 
proclaimed in 1943 consisted of five republics as national homelands (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and one as a tri-national unit (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). The subsequent Constitution also established two autonomous 
provinces with large non-Serb populations within Serbia (Kosovo — which was 
initially called an “autonomous region”, only to be promoted into a province in 
1963 — and Vojvodina). Both measures were designed to curb Serbia’s 
hegemonism. The 1974 Constitution went even further: the two provinces were 
now directly represented at both Serbian and Federal levels and gained the power 
to veto decision-making on issues requiring consensus. For the Serbian 
nationalizing nationalism couchante, this was a serious blow, perceived as a loss 
of control over the entire territory of its national state. Also, after the Croatian 
nationalist movement in 1971 and the mass demonstrations in April 1981 by 
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Albanians in Kosovo demanding full republican status for the province, the 
Serbs, the largest nation in Yugoslavia, felt extremely vulnerable, as the balance 
of power was not any more in their favor. This insecurity was expressed in the 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 1986, which 
became the manifesto of the latest Serbian nationalist revival imbued with the 
rhetoric of victimization. 
The Memorandum was later denounced by the Serbian communists, but 
the new party president, Slobodan Miloševi, had already learned his lesson. 
Faced with angered Kosovar Serb demonstrators at Kosovo Polje in April 1987, 
he gave them his famous promise: “No one will ever beat you again!” In 1988 
and 89, Miloševi abolished the autonomy of the two provinces and replaced the 
political leadership in Montenegro by his own supporters. Subsequently, he 
extended his promise of protection to the Serbian diaspora in other republics of 
former Yugoslavia. He thus set the Serbian nationalist rhetoric in full swing by 
skillfully tapping into its constructed grid of dichotomies, with fatal 
consequences for South-Slav federalism. Throughout the 1990s, this rhetoric was 
the mobilizing call for Serbian fighters in the long and bloody series of wars 
leading progressively to the fragmentation of former Yugoslavia. Since July 
2001, Miloševi’s statements at the United Nations war crimes tribunal in the 
Hague have been a veritable repository of nationalist rhetoric, postulating his 
own and his people’s heroism10 and victimization.11  
Vojislav Koštunica’s electoral victory in October 2000 did not put an end 
to Serbian nationalism, but rather changed its public face by extricating it from 
the communist framework within which it had been operating under Miloševi 
and allying it more openly with its traditional alter ego, the Serbian Orthodox 
Church (Biserko 2000). The intimate, but delicate relationship between present-
day Serbia and its Bosnian off-shoot Republika Srpska, as well as the apartheid 
dividing the UN-run Kosovo, still offer fertile ground for nationalist rhetoric. It is 
therefore too early to say whether the latest development – the overwhelming 
vote by the Yugoslav Parliament (31 May 2002) in favor of a proposal to put an 
end to the Yugoslav federation and create a new looser union between Serbia and 
Montenegro – may signify a move away from expansionist rhetoric. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have sought to explain how rhetoric of othering, sometimes 
based on elements of history but, more commonly, invoking mythical narratives 
from a pool of popular culture to construct a collective identity, functions to 
mobilize dangerous passions in the service of a “national cause” for present-day 
purposes. Mythical narratives provide a self-styled mirror for the narcissistic 
national “self” – simultaneously a hero and a victim, and therefore “justified” in 
pursuing national aspirations, regardless of the cost. Serbian nationalist rhetoric 
thus fits the pattern commonly employed by nationalist discourses in other 
geographical and historical contexts. “Remember the Alamo!” is a war call which 
needs to be problematized by questions such as “What exactly is there to 
remember?” and, more importantly, “Why are we asked to do so?” 
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Notes 
 
1 “After all, the very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in 
the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests that, as so often, the 
phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies 
out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism.” 
(Hobsbawm 1990: 183) 
2 To quote Ivo Banac’s metaphor of the Russian matryoshka dolls, in Yugoslavia, there 
was always a “successively smaller toy-baby in the litter.” (Banac 1991: 148) 
3 For an informed analysis of the moral aspects of the Serbian epic, see (Brki 1961). 
4 In fact, the Serbian empire had collapsed after the death of Tsar Dušan in 1355. After 
the battle of Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox church promoted a religious-patriotic cult of 
Prince Lazar - a tradition which was revived in 1989, when his supposed remains were 
ritually carried through the “Serbian territories” of former Yugoslavia. 
5 Jug Bogdan and the nine Jugovies, Vukašin, Uglješa and Gojko Mrnjavevi, Stepan 
Musi and finally Lazar Hrebljanovi himself. 
6 Gojko is, notably, a poetic invention, while Vukašin and Uglješa Mrnjavevi are 
historical figures. 
7 Serbia’s Minister for Family Affairs, Rada Trajkovi, a former doctor in Priština, called 
Albanian women “child-bearing machines” who she claimed did not always know the 
names of all their children (Kaufman 1999). 
8 Greek, the ‘Great Idea’. The term refers to aspirations by Greek nationalists to create a 
Greek state with boundaries encompassing all the lands that had been under Byzantine 
rule or under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The idea was the 
driving force of Greek nationalism, particularly in the 18th and the 19th centuries (see 
Jelavich 1997: 262). 
9 Yugoslavism can be traced back to the Illyrian movement in 19th-century Croatia. As 
noted earlier in this paper, the idea of South Slav unification was not immediately 
embraced by the Serbian political circles.   
10 For example, his notorious statement that he “should be given credit for peace in 
Bosnia, not for war” (11 December 2001). All transcripts of Miloševi’s trial can be 
found at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm. 
11 “They [the Prosecutors] want to proclaim us the culprits, who were the victims of their 
aggression, and me, with the help of this Tribunal, to bring me before Nuremberg to 
reverse the roles. That crime, which was the crime of the killing of Yugoslavia, and 
crucifying me here, they are doing that with the help of their – today’s allies and one-time 
enemies. All the facts bear this out and all the moves actually implemented bear that out” 
(14 February 2002). 
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